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Abstract
Using a World Bank data of Chinese firms, we investigate the rel-
ative importance of bank loans and trade credit in promoting firm
performance. To deal with the possible endogeneity issue, we employ
distinct and separable instrumental variables for bank loans and trade
credit. We find that access to bank loans is central to improving firm
performance and growth, while availability of trade credit is much
less important. Our results suggest that trade credit cannot effec-
tively substitute for bank loans, and they call for further development
of formal financial institutions in China, under which its non-state
sector would have grown much faster than it actually did.
Keywords: Bank Loans, Trade Credit, Firm Performance, Firm
Growth
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1 Introduction
Formal financial system development such as banking sector development has
been shown to be instrumental to improvements in resource allocation effi-
ciency and economic growth (see, for example, King and Levine, 1993; Levine
and Zervos, 1998; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2002). At the same time,
informal financing channels such as trade credit are said to play a critical role
in sustaining firm growth (see, among others, Garmaise andMoskowitz, 2003;
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004). The question, however, becomes which
of these two financing channels is more important for firm growth. This is
particularly relevant for developing and transition economies where formal
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finance is inadequate and informal finance is prevalent. And the answer to
this question is critical for policy recommendations for financial development
in developing and transition economies.
Developing and transition economies generally lack market-supporting
economic institutions such as adequate property rights protection and ef-
fective contract enforcement. As a result, formal financing channels such
as bank loans could not develop adequately to meet the firms’ demand for
external finance. One view is that, under these circumstances, informal fi-
nance could still develop because it mainly relies on informal networks based
on long-term relationships and reputation. Consequently, informal financ-
ing channels could potentially provide alternative financing sources for firms
having poor access to formal finance so as to support firm growth and ex-
pansion. Thus, informal finance should play a pivotal role in sustaining firm
operations and growth under weak economic institutions. In contrast, the
other view holds that informal financing channels such as trade credit could
not fill in the gap left by the formal finance, because the monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms required for the functioning of informal finance are
even more adversely affected by the poor formal economic institutions, and
because informal finance typically has limited size so that it cannot support
firm expansion continuously.1 Hence, access to formal finance is still more
important for firm development. Clearly these two competing views have
strikingly different implications for the necessity and urgency of promoting
formal financial system development in developing and transition economies.
Despite the importance of this question, little systematic research has
been conducted.2 In this study, we address this issue in the context of
China. China provides an ideal setting to investigate the relative impor-
tance of formal and informal finance. Even after thirty years of economic
reform, China’s formal economic institutions remain inadequate (see, for ex-
ample, Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005). As a
result, China’s banking institutions are far from fulfilling the mission of pro-
viding sufficient financial resources for firms. Similar to the situations in most
of the other developing and transition economies, banks in China primarily
serve the financing needs of a small group of elite firms such as large-scale
state-owned enterprises, whereas most other firms, especially those medium-
1Some informal financing channels are illegal or quasi-legal because they charge a higher
interest rate than loans made by formal financial institutions. Then the contract enforce-
ment mechanism in informal finance modes becomes even more fragile.
2Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) document widespread use of infor-
mal financing channels by Chinese firms. They focus on the role of bank loans, not the
relative importance of bank loans and trade credit, in enhancing firm performance and
firm growth in China.
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and small-sized non-state-owned ones, have poor access to bank loans. Ac-
cording to Asian Development Bank (2003), the difficulty in getting access
to external finance such as bank loans is a primary serious constraint en-
countered by private enterprises in China. Under these circumstances, those
disfavored firms are believed to extensively use informal financing channels
such as trade credit to satisfy their financing needs (Allen, Qian and Qian,
2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, Maksimovic, 2008).
In this study, we use a World Bank data set of 1,566 firms located in 18
cities and 9 manufacturing industries in China to assess the relative impor-
tance of bank loans (formal finance) and trade credit (informal finance) in
contributing to firm performance and firm growth. From the ordinary-least-
squares (OLS) estimations, we find that trade credit is more important to
firm performance (labor productivity and return on total assets) and firm
growth (re-investment rate and growth of employment) than do bank loans.
These results, however, could be biased because bank loans and trade credit
are endogenously determined. To deal with the potential endogeneity issue,
we employ distinct and separable instrumental variables for bank loans and
trade credit. Specifically, we use an indicator of whether a city was British
administered in the late Qing Dynasty as an instrument for bank loans, and
an indicator of whether the suppliers for a firm are operated by the relatives
or friends of the firm owner as an instrument for trade credit. The instru-
mental variable estimations show that access to bank loans is much more
important than availability of trade credit in promoting firm performance
and firm growth, which are in sharp contrast to the OLS results and suggest
that our earlier results are biased.
Our analysis demonstrates that trade credit is not as important as bank
loans in enhancing the performance and growth of Chinese firms. These
results suggest that informal finance could not fill in the gap left by the formal
finance. For the developing and transition economies, it is an imperative to
promote the development of the formal financial system so as to enhance firm
performance and firm growth. In the case of China, even though China’s non-
state sector has achieved an impressive performance in the past decades, it
would be an overstatement to say that trade credit can replace bank loans in
sustaining a high level of firm growth. It may well be the case that China’s
non-state sector would have grown much faster than it actually did if bank
loans had been more easily available to non-state firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and
variables. Section 3 presents the ordinary least squares estimation results,
while Section 4 discusses the instrumental variable estimation results. The
paper concludes with Section 5.
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2 Data and Variables
The data used in this paper comes from a survey of firms on the investment
climate in China conducted by the World Bank and the Enterprise Survey
Organization of China in early 2003.3 It covers a total of 1,566 firms from
nine manufacturing industries located in eighteen cities.4
Our dependent variables are about firm performance and growth. To
measure firm performance, we use Labor Productivity (measured by the log-
arithm of total output per worker in 2002) and ROA (measured by the ratio
of operating profits to total assets in 2002). To measure firm growth, we use
Growth of Employment (measured by the change in the logarithm of employ-
ment from 2001 to 2002) and Reinvestment Rate (measured by the share of
net profits reinvested in 2002).
Our two key independent variables are Bank Loans (measured by the ratio
of bank loans to total assets in 2002) and Trade Credit (measured by the per-
centage of the firm’s two main inputs purchased with credit in 2002). To deal
with the potential endogeneity issue associated with bank loans and trade
credit, we use two distinct and separable instrumental variables. Specifically,
British Administration (a dummy variable indicating whether the respective
city was administered by the Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty) is used
as an instrument for Bank Loans, and Relationship (a dummy variable indi-
cating whether a firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends
of the firm owner in 2002) is used as an instrument for Trade Credit. We will
discuss these two instrumental variables in detail in Section 4.
Summary statistics of all key variables are given in Table 1.
3 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
We first conduct OLS regression analysis with the following specification:
3It is a cross-section data set with most of variables about firm operation and per-
formance in 2002 though it also contains some financial information for the period of
2000-2002.
4The nine manufacturing industries are: garment & leather products, electronic equip-
ment, electronic parts making, household electronics, automobile & automobile parts, food
processing, chemical products & medicine, biotech products & Chinese medicine, and met-
allurgical products. Meanwhile, eighteen cities are chosen from five geographical regions
so as to achieve a representative sample: 1) Northeast: Benxi, Changchun, Dalian, and
Harbin; 2) Coastal: Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, and Wenzhou; 3) Central: Chang-
sha, Nanchang, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou; 4) Southwest: Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming,
and Nanning; 5) Northwest: Lanzhou and Xi’an.
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yfic = α+ β ·Bank Loansfic + γ · Trade Creditfic + ηZfic + εfic
where yfic is the performance or growth measure of firm f in industry i and
city c; Zfic is a vector of control variables; and εfic is the error term. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the industry-city level to deal with the possible
heteroskedasticity problem.
Table 2 presents the OLS regression results. For each of the four de-
pendent variables, we first include Bank Loans and Trade Credit separately
in the regressions, and then incorporate them together. It is shown that
access to bank loans has positive and statistically significant effects on la-
bor productivity and reinvestment rate, while availability of trade credit has
positive and statistically significant effects on labor productivity, ROA, and
growth of employment. These results imply that trade credit is relatively
more important to firm performance and growth than bank loans.
4 Instrumental Variable Estimation
The OLS regression results reported in Table 2 could be seriously biased due
to the endogeneity problem associated with bank loans and trade credit. For
instance, better performing and faster growing firms are more likely to obtain
bank loans and trade credit, implying the possibility of reverse causality. It is
also possible that there could be some unobservable variables affecting both
firm performance/growth and bank loans/trade credit, leading to spurious
correlations. To address these concerns, we take the instrumental variable
approach.
4.1 Instrumental Variables: British Administration and
Relationship
Here we look for valid instrumental variables that are correlated with the
endogenous explanatory variables but should not affect the dependent vari-
ables through any channel other than the endogenous explanatory variables.
Furthermore, as we have two potentially endogenous variables, we follow
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) to look for distinct and separable instrumen-
tal variables, that is, the instruments are able to isolate the two endogenous
variables.
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First, we useBritish Administration, a dummy variable indicating whether
the respective city was administered by the Great Britain in the late Qing
Dynasty, as an instrument for Bank Loans.
During the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911), China was defeated in a series
of wars against foreign powers, including two Opium Wars with the Great
Britain, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Boxer Rebellion. In the
wake of military defeats, the Qing government was forced to sign unequal
treaties including territorial concessions. The wave of territorial partitioning
climaxed at the end of the nineteenth century, with the Great Britain gov-
erning regions along the Yangtze River (Guizhou, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan,
Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Henan, and Zhejiang provinces), France governing
Yunnan, Hainan, Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong province, Ger-
many governing Shandong province, Japan governing Fujian province, and
Russia governing Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the three north-eastern provinces
(McAleavy, 1967).5
Within their domains of control, the foreign powers imposed their own
political, economic, judicial and military systems. In particular, the foreign
powers had great influences on economic activities by setting up and de-
veloping their own banks and issuing currencies (Wang, 1957; Huang, 1994).
Nonetheless, there were variations in the development of banks across various
foreign powers, with the Great Britain having significantly more banks and
branches than other foreign powers (Wang, 1957, 1995a; Zhu, 2004; Yuan,
2005).6
5Three main reasons account for the geographical pattern of territorial partitioning by
the foreign powers. First, the geographic proximity between the foreign powers and China’s
regions is a primary force in shaping the pattern of territorial concessions (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, 2000). For example, Russia, located to the north of China, occupied most of
China’s northern regions such as Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the three northeastern provinces.
France, stepping from its colony of Vietnam that lies to the southwest of China, extended
its colonial power to the four southwestern provinces in China, i.e., Yunnan, Hainan,
Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong province (Yang, 2006). Japan, defeated by
Russia in its aggression in Northeast China, chose to occupy China’s regions such as
Taiwan and Fujian that are close to its southern territories. The second reason for the
territorial partitioning is for the control of certain products that the foreign powers needed
at that time. For example, the Great Britain, which was a big importer of tea and silk
from China, chose to occupy those regions in China that produced these two products
(Sa and Pan, 1996). Finally, the territorial occupation of Germany, which was late in its
occupation of China, was a result of bargaining and negotiation with other foreign powers
(China History Society, 1959). Hence, the geographical pattern of territorial concessions
had little to do with the industrial development capacity of different regions. It can be
regarded as an exogenous process.
6This could be explained by the better protection of creditors under the Great Britain’s
common law system than under the civil law system of other foreign powers such as France,
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The presence of foreign banks had significant impacts on the local commu-
nities, which persisted over time despite several dramatic changes in political
regimes in the subsequent decades.7 As domestic banks were dwarfed by for-
eign banks and did not develop well, the subsequent development of China’s
banking sector was largely built upon the foundation of foreign banks. It is
documented that the foreign banks, including their businesses and personnel,
were taken over by the national banks of the Republic of China, which were
subsequently taken over by the state-owned banks of the People’s Repub-
lic of China in 1949 (Zhang, 1957; Huang, 1994; Yuan, 2005). Meanwhile,
local people got used to borrowing money from foreign banks for their busi-
nesses (Wang, 1995b, 1997; Xiong and Xue, 2007), and such bank lending
and borrowing habits may persist over time.
Thus it is expected that the access to bank loans in modern China is
positively correlated with the influence of the Great Britain in the late Qing
Dynasty. Hence we use British Administration as an instrument for Bank
Loans. Specifically, in our sample, nine out of the eighteen cities (Changsha,
Chongqing, Guiyang, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Shenzhen, Wenzhou, Wuhan,
and Zhengzhou) were administered by the Great Britain, and the rest of the
sample cities were administrated by France or Russia.
Next, we use Relationship, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm’s
two main inputs are supplied by the relatives or friends of the firm owner
in 2002, as an instrument for Trade Credit. As shown by McMillan and
Woodruff (1999), suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit to their cus-
tomers when they belong to the same networks, such as families, friends, and
business associations. This is because any default by the customers would
lead to the spread of bad words among members of the same networks caus-
ing severe damages to the customers. Thus it is expected that the availability
of trade credit is positively correlated with Relationship.
4.2 Regression Results
The first stage of the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions are:
Bank Loansfic = c1 + δ1 ·British Admin istrationc + γ1 ·Relationshipfic + η1Zfic + εfic1
Trade Creditfic = c2 + δ2 ·British Admin istrationc + γ2 ·Relationshipfic + η2Zfic + εfic2
Russia, Japan and Germany, and is consistent with the findings in the literature on law
and finance, e.g., La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Levine (1998), Levine, Loayza and Beck
(2000), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003).
7Indeed, there is a growing body of literature on the persistence of culture, beliefs, and
ideologies over time (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Dohmen et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2007a,
2007b, 2008).
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As shown in Panels B-C of Table 3, Bank Loans is positively and significantly
related to British Administration but not to Relationship (Panel B), while
Trade Credit is positively and significantly associated with Relationship but
not with British Administration (Panel C). These results suggest that the
two instruments are strong and separable for the two endogenous variables.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the second-stage results of the 2SLS estima-
tions. Clearly, Bank Loans has positive and statistically significant impacts
on Labor Productivity, ROA, and Reinvestment Rate, while Trade Credit does
not have any significant impact on firm performance and growth. These re-
sults show that access to bank loans is more important for firm growth and
performance than availability of trade credit. And they are in sharp contrast
to those of the OLS estimations in Section 3, suggesting that the OLS results
are indeed biased due to the endogeneity problem and should be interpreted
with caution.
Checks on the identification strategy. The validity of the instru-
mental variable estimation hinges upon two conditions: (i) the relevance of
the instruments to the endogenous variables, and (ii) the exclusion restriction
that the instruments affect the outcome variables only through the endoge-
nous variables. Both the rationales put forward in Section 4.1 and the results
of Table 3 (Panels B-C) have addressed the first requirement.
With regard to the exclusion restriction, we use the semi-reduced form es-
timation pioneered by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). The rationale for this
estimation strategy is as follows. In the scenario where the endogenous vari-
able has no effect on the outcome variable, the instrumental variable should
also have no effect in the reduced form regression in which the outcome vari-
able is regressed directly on the instrumental variable. Otherwise, it implies
that there are other channels through which the instrumental variable can
influence the outcome variable. In the setting of two endogenous variables
and two instrumental variables, this estimation strategy is referred to as
“semi-reduced form estimation”, for the validity of the instrumental vari-
able is checked one by one. Specifically, in Columns 1-4 of Table 4 British
Administration is used as the explanatory variable instead of Bank Loans
while Trade Credit remains instrumented by Relationship. And in Columns
5-8 Relationship is used as the explanatory variable instead of Trade Credit
while Bank Loans remains instrumented by British Administration.
Note that in Table 3, Bank Loans has no significant effect on growth
of employment. In the corresponding semi-reduced form estimation (Col-
umn 3 of Table 4), British Administration indeed has no significant effect
on growth of employment. Note also that in Table 3, Trade Credit does
not have significant effects on any measure of firm performance and growth.
In the corresponding semi-reduced form estimations (Columns 5-8 of Table
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4), Relationship indeed does not have any impacts on firm performance and
growth.
While there is strong evidence suggesting that the geographical pattern
of territorial concessions had little to do with the industrial development
capacity of different regions, one may still be concerned about the validity
of the instrumental variable for Bank Loans (i.e., British Administration).
For example, some cities administered by the Great Britain may have great
prospects for economic growth, while some cities not administered by the
Great Britain may have very poor development potentials. As a result, our
estimation results could be driven by a small number of observations located
in those cities. To rule out this concern, we conduct robustness checks us-
ing two subsamples: a subsample excluding firms located in coastal British-
administered cities (i.e., Hangzhou and Wenzhou) and a subsample exclud-
ing firms located in inland non-British-administered cities (i.e., Lanzhou and
Xi’an).8 As shown in Table 5, our main results on the relative importance of
bank loans over trade credit remain robust in these two subsamples.
Meanwhile, it could be argued that the instrumental variable for Trade
Credit (i.e., Relationship) may not be truly exogenous. For example, less
profitable firms may have to rely more on their relatives and friends for sup-
plying the inputs. To rule out this concern, we include the variable Lagged
ROA and repeat the analysis. As shown in Table 6, our main results on
the relative importance of bank loans over trade credit remain robust to this
additional control. Furthermore, we also regress Relationship on a list of firm
characteristics (including lagged profitability, firm size, firm age, and percent-
age of shares being held by parties other than government agencies), CEO
characteristics (including his education, managerial experience, and govern-
ment experience), and industry and city dummies. It is found that none of
these variables has any statistically significant effect, suggesting that there
is no predictable determinant for the reliance on the relatives and friends for
supplying the inputs (results available upon request).9
For further checks on identification strategy, we directly control for some
potential channels other than the endogenous variables through which the
instrumental variables may affect firm performance and growth. Specifically,
8Because of the pattern of uneven regional development in China, coastal cities have
typically grown faster and been better developed than inland cities. Hence, firms located
in these two types of cities could potentially drive our results.
9In a further check, we compare the profitability of firms located in British-
administrated cities with that of firms relying on their relatives and friends for supplying
the inputs. It is found that though the former group has a higher mean value of profitabil-
ity (0.062±0.031) than the latter group (0.050±0.019), there is no statistically significant
difference between these two values (t value is 0.0996 with p-value 0.9207).
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for the instrumental variable of Bank Loans — British Administration, we
control for the effectiveness of contract enforcement, the security of property
rights protection and the degree of economic development.10 For the instru-
mental variable of Trade Credit — Relationship, we control for the quality
and delivery of inputs. We find that our main results on the relative impor-
tance of bank loans over trade credit remain robust to these controls (results
available upon request).
4.3 Robustness Checks
First, as a legacy of gradual reforms in China, private enterprises are discrim-
inated against but state-owned enterprises are favored by the state-owned
banking system. Thus our above results on the relative importance of bank
loans over trade credit could be overly estimated by including state-owned
enterprises in the regressions, although state-owned enterprises only account
for a small proportion of our sample firms. To address this concern, we test
the robustness of our results by focusing on a subsample of private enter-
prises only, with the results reported in Table 7. It turns out that access to
bank loans is still more important to firm performance and growth than does
availability of trade credit.
Second, one may be concerned that our results could be driven by a few
outliers. To address this possibility, we follow the methodology of Hadi (1992,
1994) in identifying the outliers in the multivariate data and exclude these
outliers in the analysis.11 The results are shown in Table 8. Clearly our
results remain robust to this exercise, implying that the concern of outliers
is not relevant in our case.
5 Conclusion
Formal finance has been found to be important for firm growth. However, for
most of the developing and transition economies where economic institutions
are poor, formal financial institutions are underdeveloped, and it is suggested
that firms instead use informal finance for their operations and expansions.
10For a survey on the role of legal origin (specifically Great Britain’s common law system)
in affecting economic institutions, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
11For a sample with n observations and p variables, the method works by first identifying
a base cluster of p + 1 observations based on the minimization of a covariance-matrix
distance on the variables with their medians removed. Then it chooses p+ 2 observations
that are closest in the covariance-matrix sense to the center of the base cluster. This
procedure continues until some optimal stopping rule is met.
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The question is whether informal finance can adequately substitute the role
of formal finance to meet the capital needs of firms.
In this paper, using a World Bank data set on Chinese firms, we system-
atically investigate the relative importance of bank loans and trade credit
in promoting firm performance and growth. To deal with the possible en-
dogeneity issue, we employ distinct and separable instrumental variables for
bank loans and trade credit. We find that access to bank loans is central to
improving firm performance and spurring firm growth, while availability of
trade credit is typically much less important. Our results suggest that trade
credit cannot effectively substitute for bank loans, and informal finance can-
not well accommodate the financing needs of the fast-growing non-state firms
in contemporary China. Moreover, our results call for further development of
formal financial institutions in China, under which China’s non-state sector
would have grown much faster than it actually did.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of 
operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 
2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is measured as 
the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit 
for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city 
was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s 
two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Lagged ROA is measured as the ratio of 
operating profits to total assets in 2001. Legal System is measured as the firm’s perception of the likelihood of legal 
system to uphold private contracts in 2002. Helping Hand is measured as the firm’s perception of the likelihood of local 
government officials acting as helping rather than hindering hand in 2002. Logarithm of GDP per capita is measured as 
the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2002. Inadequate Quality is measured as the percentage of inputs that were returned 
to their suppliers due to inadequate quality in 2002. Delivery Loss is measured as the percentage of sales that was lost 
due to the delivery delays in 2002. Percentage of Private Ownership is measured as by the percentage of ownership held 
by parties other than government agencies. Firm Size is measured as the logarithm of employment in 2002. Firm Age is 
measured as the logarithm of the years of establishment by the end of 2002. Education is measured as years of schooling 
by the end of 2002. Tenure is measured as years of being CEO by the end of 2002. Deputy CEO Before is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the CEO used to be the firm’s deputy CEO. Government Cadre is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the CED used to be a government official.  
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Labor Productivity 1,557  4.322 1.562 -3.989 11.893
ROA  1,547  0.021 0.761 -16.820 20.870
Growth of Employment 1,563  0.052 0.480 -2.303 5.333
Reinvestment Rate 1,406  0.188 0.329 0.000 1.000
Bank Loans 1,529  0.058 0.136 0.000 0.952
Trade Credit 1,368  0.357 0.373 0.000 1.000
British Administration 1,566  0.510 0.500 0.000 1.000
Relationship 1,442  0.021 0.123 0.000 1.000
Lagged ROA 1,542 0.041 0.735 -6.417 20.571
Table 2: OLS Regressions 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. Standard 
errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Constant terms are included in the 
regressions but not reported (available upon request).   
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Panel A: Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA 
Estimation OLS OLS 
Bank Loans 2.049***  1.838*** 0.073  0.041 
  (0.320)  (0.322) (0.050)  (0.061) 
Trade Credit  0.914*** 0.837***  0.102** 0.106** 
   (0.127) (0.130)  (0.049) (0.050) 
No. of Observation 1,521 1,364 1,333 1,511 1,356 1,326 
R-squared 0.0319 0.0515 0.0808 0.0002 0.0022 0.0025 
Panel B: Dependent Variable Growth of Employment Reinvestment Rate 
Estimation OLS Tobit 
Bank Loan 0.112  0.134 0.817***  0.738*** 
  (0.082)  (0.083) (0.174)  (0.173) 
Trade Credit  0.087** 0.083**  -0.015 -0.054 
   (0.038) (0.039)  (0.090) (0.090) 
No. of Observation 1,526 1,367 1,336 1,374 1,226 1,199 
R-squared/Pseudo R2 0.0010 0.0049 0.0067 0.0070 0.0000 0.0059 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: 2SLS Regressions 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of 
operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 
2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is measured as 
the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit 
for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city 
was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s 
two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Standard errors, clustered at the 
industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
Constant terms are included in the regressions but not reported (available upon request).   
 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA  Growth of Employment Reinvestment Rate 
Bank Loans 15.543*** 2.499* 1.246 5.181** 
  (5.906) (1.325) (1.341) (2.393) 
Trade Credit 1.208 0.073 0.391 0.107 
  (1.707) (0.179) (0.535) (1.053) 
No. of Observation 1,303 1,296 1,306 1,172 
 Panel B: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Bank Loans 
British Administration 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Relationship 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
No. of Observation 1,410 1,410 1,410 1,410 
R-squared 0.0176 0.0176 0.0176 0.0176 
 Panel C: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Trade Credit 
British Administration 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.051 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Relationship 0.276** 0.276** 0.276** 0.276** 
 （0.106） （0.106） （0.106） （0.106） 
No. of Observation 1，337 1，337 1，337 1，337 
R-squared 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 
Table 4: 2SLS Regressions, Semi-reduced Form 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British 
Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, 
**, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Constant terms are included in the regressions but not reported (available upon request).  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent Variable 
Labor 
Productivity ROA 
Growth of 
Employment
Reinvestment 
Rate 
Labor 
Productivity ROA 
Growth of 
Employment
Reinvestment 
Rate 
Bank Loans     16.173*** 2.465** 1.732** 5.643*** 
      (5.172) (1.376) (0.823) (2.135) 
British Administration 0.544** 0.092** 0.040 0.143*     
  (0.209) (0.046) (0.046) (0.082)     
Trade Credit 1.494 0.101 0.383 0.797     
  (1.543) (0.154) (0.474) (0.987)     
Relationship     0.377 0.008 0.084 -0.110 
     (0.368) (0.042) (0.115) (0.263) 
No. of Observation 1,333 1,325 1,336 1,198 1,405 1,397 1,408 1,264 
 
 
Table 5: 2SLS Regressions, Sub-sample without Special Cities  
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British 
Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Coastal British administrated cities are Hangzhou and Wenzhou, whereas inland non-
British administrated cities are Lanzhou and Xi’an. Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% 
level respectively. Constant terms are included in the regressions but not reported (available upon request).  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sub-sample Without Coastal British Administrated Cities Without Inland Non-British Administrated Cities 
Dependent Variable 
Labor 
Productivity ROA 
Growth of 
Employment
Reinvestment 
Rate 
Labor 
Productivity ROA 
Growth of 
Employment
Reinvestment 
Rate 
Bank Loans 20.151** 2.324* 0.445 5.698 13.811** 3.005* 2.492** 4.897* 
  (9.322) (1.232) (2.048) (3.925) (6.669) (1.550) (0.960) (2.568) 
Trade Credit -0.512 -0.070 0.609 -0.520 1.736 -0.008 -0.211 -0.232 
  (2.725) (0.141) (0.867) (1.658) (1.195) (0.180) (0.148) (0.898) 
No. of Observation 1,194 1,188 1,197 1,066 1,150 1,145 1,152 1,023 
Table 6: 2SLS Regressions, Inclusion of Lagged Profitability 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British 
Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Lagged ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2001. 
Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Constant terms are included in 
the regressions but not reported (available upon request).  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA  Growth of Employment Reinvestment Rate 
Bank Loans 15.291** 2.293* 1.086 5.101** 
  (5.907) (1.358) (1.354) (2.398) 
Trade Credit 1.226 0.060 0.408 0.112 
  (1.707) (0.176) (0.535) (1.055) 
Lagged ROA 0.036 0.255 0.010 0.084*** 
 (0.080) (0.603) (0.009) (0.031) 
No. of Observation 1,293 1,292 1,295 1,162 
Table 7: 2SLS Regressions, Sub-sample of Private Enterprises 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British 
Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Private enterprise is defined as those whose percentage of private ownership is great 
than 0.5. Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Constant terms are 
included in the regressions but not reported (available upon request).  
 
 1 2 3 4 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA  Growth of Employment Reinvestment Rate 
Bank Loans 14.392** 3.145* 0.751 4.725* 
  (6.186) (1.650) (1.491) (2.625) 
Trade Credit 1.058 -0.033 0.318 0.104 
  (1.757) (0.209) (0.561) (1.080) 
No. of Observation 1,063 1,058 1,066 965 
Table 8: 2SLS Regressions, Outliers 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British 
Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Outliers are identified using Hadi (1992, 1994)’s methodology. Standard errors, 
clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Constant terms are included in the regressions 
but not reported (available upon request).  
 
 
 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA  Growth of Employment 
Bank Loans 11.949** 0.280 0.149 
  (5.885) (0.240) (0.411) 
Trade Credit 1.225 0.174 0.166 
  (2.140) (0.143) (0.143) 
No. of Observation 934 905 914 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: 2SLS Regressions, Other Channels for British Administration 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of 
Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is 
measured as the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British 
Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the firm’s two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Legal System is measured as the firm’s perception of the likelihood of legal system to 
uphold private contracts in 2002. Helping Hand is measured as the firm’s perception of the likelihood of local government officials acting as helping rather than hindering hand in 2002. 
Logarithm of GDP per capita is measured as the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2002. Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. First stages 
of 2SLS include same controls as those in the second stages but results are not reported to save space (available upon request). *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level 
respectively. Constant terms are included in the regressions but not reported (available upon request). 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA Growth of Employment Reinvestment Rate 
Bank Loans 13.166** 13.259** 13.165** 2.911* 2.831* 2.882* 1.287 1.255 1.255 5.559** 5.483** 5.565** 
  (5.768) (5.708) (5.751) (1.659) (1.608) (1.633) (1.283) (1.282) (1.272) (2.182) (2.160) (2.210) 
Trade Credit 0.983 1.015 0.483 0.075 0.092 0.140 0.535 0.539 0.499 -0.679 -0.698 -0.684 
  (1.989) (1.995) (2.065) (0.215) (0.208) (0.218) (0.720) (0.724) (0.803) (1.118) (1.111) (1.195) 
Legal System -0.168 -0.311 -0.265 -0.165 -0.152 -0.158 -0.096* -0.107* -0.104* 0.076 0.030 0.025 
  (0.195) (0.205) (0.202) (0.139) (0.129) (0.131) (0.055) (0.056) (0.062) (0.107) (0.112) (0.118) 
Helping Hand  0.441*** 0.431***  -0.093 -0.090  0.024 0.023  0.260** 0.263** 
   (0.139) (0.138)  (0.080) (0.079)  (0.041) (0.040)  (0.107) (0.109) 
Logarithm of GDP per capita   0.292   -0.045*   0.017   -0.033 
    (0.199)   (0.025)   (0.068)   (0.102) 
No. of Observation 1,148 1,125 1,125 1,143 1,120 1,120 1,151 1,128 1,128 1,041 1,021 1,021 
 Panel B: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Bank Loans 
British Administration 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Relationship 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.009 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
No. of Observation 1,234 1,210 1,210 1,234 1,210 1,210 1,234 1,210 1,210 1,234 1,210 1,210 
R-squared 0.0267 0.0272 0.0290 0.0267 0.0272 0.0290 0.0267 0.0272 0.0290 0.0267 0.0272 0.0290 
 Panel C: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Trade Credit 
 British Administration 0.036 0.037 0.032 0.036 0.037 0.032 0.036 0.037 0.032 0.036 0.037 0.032 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
Relationship 0.286*** 0.283*** 0.259*** 0.286*** 0.283*** 0.259*** 0.286*** 0.283*** 0.259*** 0.286*** 0.283*** 0.259*** 
  (0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111) 
No. of Observation 1,175 1,152 1,152 1,175 1,152 1,152 1,175 1,152 1,152 1,175 1,152 1,152 
R-squared 0.0141 0.0152 0.0239 0.0141 0.0152 0.0239 0.0141 0.0152 0.0239 0.0141 0.0152 0.0239 
Appendix 2: 2SLS Regressions, Other Channels for Relationship 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of 
operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 
2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is measured as 
the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit 
for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city 
was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s 
two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Inadequate Quality is measured as the 
percentage of inputs that were returned to their suppliers due to inadequate quality in 2002. Delivery Loss is measured as 
the percentage of sales that was lost due to the delivery delays in 2002. Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city 
level, are presented in the parenthesis. First stages of 2SLS include same controls as those in the second stages but 
results are not reported to save space (available upon request). *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level 
respectively. Constant terms are included in the regressions but not reported (available upon request). 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity Dependent Variable Labor Productivity Dependent Variable 
Estimation  OLS Estimation  OLS Estimation  
Bank Loans 15.851*** 16.305*** 2.525* 2.348* 1.324 1.345 5.011** 4.642* 
  (5.942) (6.086) (1.334) (1.215) (1.333) (1.405) (2.378) (2.440) 
Trade Credit 1.141 0.467 0.073 0.080 0.369 0.410 0.123 0.306 
  (1.677) (1.833) (0.176) (0.213) (0.531) (0.620) (1.037) (1.119) 
Quality -1.556* -1.433* -0.107* -0.225* -0.314** -0.348* -0.032 -0.138 
  (0.788) (0.830) (0.062) (0.118) (0.152) (0.183) (0.459) (0.499) 
Delivery Loss  1.474  1.396  0.163  0.754 
  (1.224)  (1.305)  (0.294)  (0.686) 
No. of Observation 1,295 1,276 1,289 1,270 1.298 1,279 1,166 1,149 
 Panel B: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Bank Loans 
British Administration 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Relationship 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 
  (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) 
No. of Observation 1,396 1,374 1,396 1,374 1,396 1,374 1,396 1,374 
R-squared 0.0189 0.0199 0.0189 0.0199 0.0189 0.0199 0.0189 0.0199 
 Panel C: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Trade Credit 
British Administration 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.047 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Relationship 0.282*** 0.261** 0.282*** 0.261** 0.282*** 0.261** 0.282*** 0.261** 
  (0.107) (0.111) (0.107) (0.111) (0.107) (0.111) (0.107) (0.111) 
No. of Observation 1,329 1,310 1,329 1,310 1,329 1,310 1,329 1,310 
R-squared 0.0185 0.0177 0.0185 0.0177 0.0185 0.0177 0.0185 0.0177 
 
  
Appendix 3: 2SLS Regressions, With Controls 
 
Note: Labor Productivity is measured as the logarithm of total output per worker in 2002. ROA is measured as the ratio of 
operating profits to total assets in 2002. Growth of Employment is measured as the logarithm change in employment from 
2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is measured as the share of net profits reinvested in 2002. Bank Loans is measured as 
the ratio of bank loans to total assets in 2002. Trade Credit is measured as the percentage of inputs purchased with credit 
for the firm’s two main inputs in 2002. British Administration is a dummy variable indicating whether the respective city 
was administered by Great Britain in the late Qing Dynasty. Relationship is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm’s 
two main inputs are supplied by relatives or friends of the firm owner in 2002. Percentage of Private Ownership is 
measured as by the percentage of ownership held by parties other than government agencies. Firm Size is measured as 
the logarithm of employment in 2002. Firm Age is measured as the logarithm of the years of establishment by the end of 
2002. CEO characteristics include: Education is measured as years of schooling by the end of 2002; Tenure is measured 
as years of being CEO by the end of 2002; Deputy CEO Before is a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO used to 
be the firm’s deputy CEO; andGovernment Cadre is a dummy variable indicating whether the CED used to be a 
government official. Standard errors, clustered at the industry/city level, are presented in the parenthesis. First stages of 
2SLS include same controls as those in the second stages but results are not reported to save space (available upon 
request). *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Constant terms are included in the 
regressions but not reported (available upon request).  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Panel A: Second Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Labor Productivity ROA 
Estimation OLS OLS 
Bank Loans 14.316** 14.857*** 14.194*** 2.841* 2.978* 4.304** 
  (5.692) (5.441) (5.162) (1.480) (1.572) (2.007) 
Trade Credit 0.872 0.483 0.392 0.044 -0.055 0.013 
  (1.404) (1.515) (1.531) (0.200) (0.244) (0.216) 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.137 0.209 0.236 0.046 0.047 0.053 
  (0.165) (0.158) (0.144) (0.042) (0.035) (0.036) 
Firm Size -0.006 -0.034 -0.024 -0.040** -0.039* -0.067**
  (0.135) (0.123) (0.130) (0.019) (0.022) (0.033) 
Firm Age -0.441*** -0.396*** -0.395*** -0.001 0.001 0.008 
  (0.094) (0.090) (0.086) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) 
F-statistic for CEO Characteristics  [3.46]** [2.61]**  [0.66] [0.77] 
F-statistic for Industrial Dummies   [3.50]***   [0.74] 
No. of Observation 1,303 1,280 1,280 1,295 1,273 1,273 
 Panel B: Second Stage of 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Growth of Employment Reinvestment Rate 
Estimation OLS Tobit 
Bank Loans 1.218 1.220 2.286 5.425** 5.234* 7.112** 
  (1.345) (1.393) (2.018) (2.656) (2.733) (3.355) 
Trade Credit 0.316 0.321 0.358 0.077 0.079 0.125 
  (0.547) (0.592) (0.585) (1.098) (1.161) (1.144) 
Percentage of Private Ownership 0.106*** 0.093*** 0.097*** -0.044 -0.081 -0.060 
  (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.115) (0.112) (0.111) 
Firm Size -0.020 -0.011 -0.035 -0.067 -0.047 -0.092 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.035) (0.073) (0.069) (0.085) 
Firm Age -0.061*** -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.170*** -0.203*** -0.194***
  (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) (0.061) (0.064) (0.065) 
F-statistic for GM Characteristics  [3.25]** [2.77]**  [4.45]*** [4.76]***
F-statistic for Industrial Dummies   [0.49]   [1.21] 
No. of Observation 1,306 1,283 1,283 1.171 1,149 1,149 
 Panel C: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Bank Loans 
 British Administration 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.023** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.023** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Relationship 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.002 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
No. of Observation 1,409 1,381 1,381 1,409 1,381 1,381 
R-squared 0.0558 0.0525 0.0636 0.0558 0.0525 0.0636 
 Panel D: First Stage of 2SLS, dependent variable is Trade Credit 
British Administration 0.026 0.025 0.010 0.026 0.025 0.010 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Relationship 0.258*** 0.243** 0.240** 0.258*** 0.243** 0.240** 
  (0.096) (0.095) (0.094) (0.096) (0.095) (0.094) 
No. of Observation 1,336 1,311 1,311 1,336 1,311 1,311 
R-squared 0.0493 0.0557 0.0676 0.0493 0.0557 0.0676 
 
 
